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Anxiety can be an adaptive response to potentially threatening situations. However, if experienced in
inappropriate contexts, it can also lead to pathological and maladaptive anxiety disorders. Experimen-
tally, anxiety can be induced in healthy individuals using the threat of shock (ToS) paradigm. Accumu-
lating work with this paradigm suggests that anxiety promotes harm–avoidant mechanisms through
enhanced inhibitory control. However, the specific cognitive mechanisms underlying anxiety-linked
inhibitory control are unclear. Critically, behavioral inhibition can arise from at least 2 interacting
valuation systems: instrumental (a goal-directed system) and Pavlovian (a “hardwired” reflexive system).
The present study (N  62) replicated a study showing improved response inhibition under ToS in
healthy participants, and additionally examined the impact of ToS on aversive and appetitive Pavlovian-
instrumental interactions in a reinforced go/no-go task. When Pavlovian and instrumental systems were
in conflict, ToS increased inhibition to aversive events, while leaving appetitive interactions unperturbed.
We argue that anxiety promotes avoidant behavior in potentially harmful situations by potentiating
aversive Pavlovian reactions (i.e., promoting avoidance in the face of threats). Critically, such a
mechanism would drive adaptive harm–avoidant behavior in threatening situations where Pavlovian and
instrumental processes are aligned, but at the same time, result in maladaptive behaviors when misaligned
and where instrumental control would be advantageous. This has important implications for our
understanding of the mechanisms that underlie pathological anxiety.
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Anxiety disorders constitute a leading global disease burden
(Baxter, Vos, Scott, Ferrari, & Whiteford, 2014), but their neuro-
cognitive underpinnings are poorly understood. Indeed, we have
relatively little understanding of the effects of adaptive anxiety in
healthy individuals. This is important, as the mechanisms under-
lying adaptive anxiety are thought to form the basis of pathological
anxiety (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, &
Grillon, 2013).
Adaptive anxiety can be explored in healthy individuals using
the threat of shock (ToS) paradigm (Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013;
Schmitz & Grillon, 2012). This paradigm reliably increases gen-
eral response inhibition (Aylward & Robinson, 2017; Grillon,
Robinson, Mathur, & Ernst, 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, & Grillon,
2013; Torrisi et al., 2016) and facilitates aversive processing
(Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013). These observations, together with
avoidance behaviors in pathological anxiety (Craske et al., 2009),
support the hypothesis that adaptive anxiety promotes harm–
avoidant behavior through aversive-linked inhibitory control.
Aversive-linked inhibition may, however, be driven by at least
two separate but parallel valuation systems: Pavlovian and instru-
mental (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). The Pavlovian system re-
flects reflexive, evolutionary-appropriate behavioral patterns to
outcomes (rewards/punishments) or stimuli associated with these
outcomes through classical conditioning. The general prepotent
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response of the Pavlovian system toward potential rewards is
response vigor (approach), producing a Pavlovian “go” bias in the
face of rewards. Pavlovian responses in the face of potentially
negative outcomes are generally associated with avoidance or
inhibitory responses (McNaughton & Corr, 2004).1 Action and
valence are therefore thought to be intrinsically coupled in the
Pavlovian system (i.e., instinctively producing invigorating actions
toward rewards/inhibitory responses in the face of punishments). It
is believed that these behavioral patterns were promoted by evo-
lution due to their advantage of increasing survival. They are
therefore optimal and efficient in many environments, but fail to
adapt to situations requiring different actions to outcomes than the
preprogrammed patterns (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008).
Instrumental behaviors (i.e., instrumental conditioning), by con-
trast, are flexible behaviors based on learning the appropriate
actions (approach or inhibition) to maximize rewards and mini-
mize punishments. Action and valence are therefore independent
from one another in the instrumental system which generates the
optimal actions to optimize outcomes in a situation specific man-
ner.
Behavior is ultimately guided by an interaction between Pav-
lovian and instrumental processes (Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw,
2006; Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014; Guitart-Masip
et al., 2012; Rigoli, Pavone, & Pezzulo, 2012; Talmi, Seymour,
Dayan, & Dolan, 2008) such that performance is facilitated when
these systems are aligned by promoting the same actions (e.g., both
promote go actions), but impaired when in conflict by producing
opposite actions (e.g., Pavlovian system generates go actions while
instrumental promotes no-go actions). For example, when there is
a perceived benefit to withholding responses to rewards for the
promise of a better outcome in the future (e.g., dieting) the instru-
mental system has to override the reflexive Pavlovian bias to
approach rewards. Importantly, most tasks (e.g., O’Doherty et al.,
2004) omit conditions that place these systems in conflict (i.e., “go
to avoid punishment” and “no-go to obtain reward”), meaning that
teasing these processes apart has not been possible in prior studies.
Enhanced aversive Pavlovian processes have been observed in
anxiety disorders (Duits et al., 2015; Lissek et al., 2005), and
induced anxiety in healthy individuals shifts the balance away
from deliberative toward more automatic behaviors (Otto, Raio,
Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013; Schwabe & Wolf, 2011). ToS has
also been shown to enhance the neural substrates of aversive but
not appetitive Pavlovian conditioning (Robinson, Overstreet,
Charney, Vytal, & Grillon, 2013), but the influence of Pavlovian
processes over instrumental responses during ToS is yet to be
explored. This question is particularly important in light of recent
research suggesting that aberrant Pavlovian-instrumental interac-
tions, especially during conflict, constitute a core mechanism
underlying affective disorders, driven mainly by anomalous Pav-
lovian rather than instrumental processes (Boureau & Dayan,
2011; Dayan & Huys, 2008; Huys et al., 2011, 2012; Huys et al.,
2016; Huys, Guitart-Masip, Dolan, & Dayan, 2015; Itzhak, Perez-
Lanza, & Liddie, 2014).
To address this question, we examined the behavior of healthy
volunteers during instructed Pavlovian-instrumental interactions
under threatening and safe conditions. We first replicated the effect
of ToS on a nonvalenced inhibitory control task (Aylward &
Robinson, 2017; Grillon et al., 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, et al.,
2013; Torrisi et al., 2016), demonstrating (as predicted) improved
inhibition under threat as a positive control. We next explored the
effect of ToS on a reinforced go/no-go task where action (go/no-
go) and valence (reward/punishment) were varied orthogonally to
create conditions where the Pavlovian and instrumental systems
were either aligned (“go to obtain reward”; “no-go to avoid pun-
ishment”) or in conflict (“go to avoid punishment”; “no-go to
obtain reward”). The main outcome measure assessing Pavlovian-
instrumental interactions in this task is response latencies (Crock-
ett, Clark, & Robbins, 2009), such that faster responses mark go
actions and slowing of responses indicate inhibition (no-go) of
actions. Previous studies have demonstrated that performance on
such tasks is altered when the Pavlovian and instrumental systems
conflict as demonstrated by either reduced accuracy or altered
response times (e.g., Crockett et al., 2009; Guitart-Masip et al.,
2012). Based on the theoretical view that anxiety promotes aver-
sive inhibitory Pavlovian processing (Dayan & Huys, 2008), we
hypothesized that the Pavlovian no-go bias in the face of potential
losses would be amplified by ToS. Specifically, we predicted that
ToS would result in increased inhibition, selective to punishment,
when the Pavlovian and instrumental systems were in conflict.
Method
Participants
Sixty-two healthy participants (39 females; age range  18–57;
Mage  27.16, SD  7.83) were recruited from the University
College London (UCL) Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience Sub-
ject Database. Sample size was determined by an a priori power
analysis in GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
The power analysis was based on the main finding from the
reinforced go/no-go task showing that participants are significantly
slower to respond in the punished conditions relative to the re-
warded conditions, with a Cohen’s dz (within-subjects) effect size
of 0.487 (Crockett et al., 2009). Detecting an effect size of this
magnitude using a paired t test requires 57 participants at the 0.05
alpha level (two-tailed) with 95% power. The present study re-
cruited 62 participants to allow for a small number of unusable
data sets.
Due to a recording fault during the sustained attention to re-
sponse task (SART), one female participant was excluded, result-
ing in 61 participants in the SART. Participants reported no history
of psychiatric, neurological or substance use disorders and no
pacemaker implantation. Participants provided written informed
consent and were reimbursed £7.50/hr for participation. To incen-
tivize performance, participants were also informed that they could
receive additional financial compensation based on task perfor-
mance. The study obtained ethical approval from the UCL Re-
search Ethics Committee (Project ID Number: 1764/001) and was
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Data
and materials for the tasks are freely available for download
(https://figshare.com/articles/SART_script/3443093 and https://dx
.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.3291299.v1).
1 It should be noted that the Pavlovian response in the face of punish-
ments is generally situation-specific, such that fight reactions are elicited to
proximal threats but inhibitory reactions are elicited to distal threats. Here,
we focus on the latter but not the former Pavlovian behavioral response to
potential losses.
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Procedure
The ToS procedure is identical to Mkrtchian, Aylward, Dayan,
Roiser, and Robinson (2017). Anxiety was induced with the ToS
paradigm where unpredictable electric shocks were delivered with
two electrodes attached to the nondominant wrist using a Digitimer
DS5 Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer Ltd, Welwyn Garden
City, U.K.). A highly unpleasant but not painful (Schmitz &
Grillon, 2012) subjective shock level was established using a
shock work-up procedure prior to testing. No more than five (to
avoid habituation) shocks with a gradually increasing shock level
were administered. Participants rated each shock on a scale from 1
(barely felt it) to 5 (unbearable) to reach a shock level of 4. The
reinforced go/no-go task was programmed in Psychtoolbox (http://
psychtoolbox.org) and the SART in Cogent (Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging and Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience,
UCL, London, U.K.) using MATLAB (Release 2014a, The Math-
Works, Inc., Natick, MA, United States).
Both tasks were presented on a laptop and administered under
alternating safe and threat blocks. During the safe block, the
background color was blue and the block was preceded by a
4000ms message stating, “You are now safe from shock.” During
the threat block, the background color was red and the message,
“Warning! You are now at risk of shock” was presented for 4,000
ms at the beginning. Participants were told that they might receive
a shock only during the threat condition but that the shocks were
not dependent on their performance. At the end of each experi-
mental task, participants retrospectively rated how anxious,
stressed and afraid they felt during the safe and threat conditions
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very much so). Numerous
previous studies have implemented this questionnaire to assess
effectiveness of the threat condition (Robinson, Vytal, et al.,
2013). The reinforced go/no-go task and SART were administered
together with a third task (the third task was part of a larger study
including a patient group and are published separately: Mkrtchian
et al., 2017). All experimental tasks were administered in a coun-
terbalanced order across participants.
SART. The SART (nonvalenced inhibition task) was pro-
grammed in Cogent using MATLAB. Participants were presented
with frequent “go” stimuli (“”), during which they had to press
spacebar and infrequent “no-go” stimuli (“O”), when they were
required to withhold a response. The stimuli were presented in a
random order, for 250 ms with a 1,750 ms intertrial interval (ITI).
In each block the go-trials occurred 47 or 48 times while the no-go
trials were presented four or five times: 190 go and 18 no-go trials
in total across all safe or threat blocks. The task was run in eight
blocks, alternating threat and safe conditions (Robinson, Krimsky,
et al., 2013). The order of the safe and threat blocks was counter-
balanced across participants. The task lasted approximately 18 min
with one shock delivered in the first, second and last threat block.
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately as
possible.
Reinforced go/no-go task. The reinforced go/no-go task was
programmed in Psychtoolbox using MATLAB. The task was
adapted from Crockett et al. (2009), which is based on a signal-
detection paradigm. Participants were asked on each trial to deter-
mine if a target tile color was in the majority or minority in a
checkerboard. They were required to press the spacebar (go re-
sponse) if the target color (blue or yellow, counterbalanced across
participants) was in the majority (go trial) and to withhold (no-go
response) a keypress if the target color was in the minority (no-go
trial; Figure 1). Thus, the signal in this task is the color that is in
the majority (i.e., go trials). As in Crockett et al. (2009), go and
no-go trials were equally divided between easy (16:9 blue/yellow
tile ratio and vice versa) and difficult (13:12 blue/yellow tile ratio
and vice versa) checkerboards.
The task comprised four action–valence (A-V) conditions where
action (go/no-go) was crossed with valence (reward/punishment):
go to win reward (GW), go to avoid punishment (GA), no-go to
win reward (NGW), and no-go to avoid punishment (NGA). All
A-V conditions included checkerboards with both 50% go trials
and 50% no-go trials, such that we were able to acquire go RTs in
all four A-V conditions. Critically, to bias responses toward the
different actions (go/no-go), some responses were rewarded or
punished more strongly depending on the A-V condition. Specif-
ically, responses were biased toward go in the GW condition by
rewarding correct go responses more than correct no-go responses.
Similarly, correct no-go responses were rewarded more than cor-
rect go responses in the NGW condition. In the GA condition,
responses were biased toward go by punishing incorrect go re-
sponses less severely than incorrect no-go responses. Finally,
incorrect go responses were punished more severely than incorrect
no-go responses in the NGA condition to bias responses toward
no-go in this condition (see Figure 2). Large rewards received 10
points and a happy face; small rewards earned 1 point and a happy
face. For large punishments, participants lost 10 points and re-
ceived a fearful face; for small punishments, they lost 1 point and
received a fearful face. Faces were chosen from the Ekman stimuli
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976) for consistency with our prior work
(Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013) with stimulus gender counterbal-
anced across participants. The outcome was presented for 1,000
ms with a 250-ms ITI.
The task began with two practice blocks, both without the
influence of the threat manipulation. The first practice block began
with 48 neutral (without outcomes) practice trials. Participants
were asked to respond to the checkerboards as quickly and accu-
rately as possible. The stimuli were presented for 2,000 ms with a
250-ms ITI. The second practice block comprised of guided prac-
tice blocks for each A-V condition (order randomized across
participants), containing four trials each, allowing participants to
learn the action–outcome contingencies for each A-V task condi-
tion. To yoke task difficulty with respect to individual differences
in reaction time (RT), the stimulus duration for the main task was
set as the mean RT of the correct responses from the first practice
block.
The main task had eight blocks in total (four threat, four safe),
with the safe/threat block order counterbalanced across partici-
pants. The A-V conditions were presented in blocks and occurred
twice (once under threat and once under safe), with safe/threat
order randomized across participants (see Figure 1). Each block
started with a neutral condition (36 nonreinforced trials), to allow
RTs to return to baseline and thus avoid any carryover effects from
previous reinforced blocks, followed by one out of the four A-V
conditions (36 trials): GW, GA, NGW, NGA. Prior to the start of
each A-V condition, participants were explicitly informed which
A-V condition they were about to complete by text instructions on
the screen. To begin each A-V experimental block, participants
had to press the spacebar after reading the text instruction. The task
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lasted around 25 min with one shock delivered during task per-
formance in the second and fourth threat blocks.
Data Analysis
All data were analyzed in SPSS version 22 (IBM Corp,
Armonk, NY) and inspected for deviations from normality
assumptions prior to analysis (of which none were found). For
all analyses, p  .05 was considered statistically significant.
For all paired t test analyses, Cohen’s dz effect size (within-
subjects) was calculated (Lakens, 2013). The index of variation
in figures was calculated according to the formula (Equation 1)
by Loftus and Masson (1994) as standard error of the mean
(SEM) is not appropriate error information for within-subjects
designs.
SEMwithin  SQRTMSE ⁄ n, (1)
where MSE represents the mean squared error of the relevant main
effect from the repeated-measures analysis and n represents the
number of participants. The SEMwithin captures the within-subjects
variance only (changes in scores from safe to threat conditions
within each participant) by removing between-subjects variance
(differences between participants) and is therefore an appropriate
method to illustrate graphically the differences in means in within-
subjects designs.
Frequentist statistics were supplemented with Bayesian statistics
to quantify the confidence in the main null effects. Bayesian
analyses were performed in JASP Version 0.8.1.1 using the default
prior (Love et al., 2014; Morey & Rouder, 2015; Rouder, Morey,
Speckman, & Province, 2012). Bayesian statistics were used to
Figure 1. Trial sequence for all the action–valence (A-V) conditions in the reinforced go/no-go task. Each A-V
condition began with a neutral block (36 trials) to allow reaction times (RTs) to equilibrate, followed by one of
the four A-V experimental conditions (36 trials). Displayed are the trial sequence for each A-V condition under
(a) safe and (b) threat. The safe and threat blocks were presented in alternating order, counterbalanced across
participants. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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obtain Bayes factors (BF10) for the model of interest, relative to the
null model (main effect of participants). To facilitate interpretation
of the magnitude difference between models (BF10 of model of
interest divided by the BF10 of the comparison model), a model
1–3 times better than the comparison model was considered “an-
ecdotal,” 3–10 was “substantial,” 10–30 was “strong,” 30–100
was “very strong,” and 100 was “decisive” (Jeffreys, 1998).
Anxiety manipulation check. Paired t tests were used to
analyze the retrospective ratings of anxiety, stress and fear during
the threat and safe conditions.
SART. Percent correct scores were analyzed on no-go trials
during the threat and safe conditions (go accuracy across the safe
and threat condition was above 97%) using a paired t test. RTs
were analyzed with a paired t test (correct go trials only) between
threat and safe conditions.
Reinforced go/no-go task.
Primary analysis: Pavlovian-instrumental interactions. As
the present study was based on the original study by Crockett and
colleagues (2009), our Pavlovian-instrumental analysis aims to
replicate the original approach as closely as possible. Pavlovian-
instrumental interactions were analyzed by extracting RTs for
correct go trials only (i.e., a go response on a go trial) for all A-V
conditions in threat and safe blocks. In line with Crockett et al.
(2009), RTs were collapsed across easy and difficult trials. RTs
were normalized within subject (using the mean and standard
deviation of the first practice block) to assess the influence of each
A-V condition (GW, GA, NGW, NGA) on RTs. Prior to analysis,
we reasoned that the first practice block (48 trials) would provide
the most accurate and appropriate measure of baseline RTs in our
study. This is in contrast to Crockett et al. (2009), where the first
neutral 36 trials (without outcomes) from the main task were used
as baseline. This is because in the present study the first 36 trials
in each A-V condition alternated between threat and safe across
participants due to the within-session threat manipulation. The first
practice was, by contrast, experienced prior to the ToS manipula-
tion. The normalized RTs were analyzed with a repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with threat (threat, safe), action
bias (go, no-go) and valence (reward, punishment) as within-
subjects factors. More negative z-score values indicate faster go
responses.
Secondary analyses: Go/no-go bias check. Although the re-
inforced go/no-go task is primarily designed to measure RT dif-
ferences between the A-V conditions (Crockett et al., 2009), we
also examined accuracy to assess if the go/no-go bias manipulation
had worked as intended. Analyses of hit rate (HR) and false alarm
rate (FAR) scores were conducted to assess performance on go and
no-go trials across the different A-V conditions. Response bias
from signal detection theory was also calculated (Stanislaw &
Todorov, 1999). This measure reflects whether the asymmetric
reward and punishment reinforcement schedules were effective in
Figure 2. The action–outcome reinforcement schedules for each action–valence task condition. (a) In the go
win (GW) condition, actions were biased toward go, by rewarding correct go responses more strongly than
correct no-go responses; incorrect responses were not rewarded. (b) In the go avoid (GA) condition actions were
biased toward go, by punishing incorrect no-go responses more harshly than incorrect go responses; correct
responses were not punished. (c) In the no-go win (NGW) condition actions were biased toward no-go,
by rewarding correct no-go responses more strongly than correct go responses; incorrect responses were not
rewarded. (d) In the no-go avoid (NGA) condition actions were biased toward no-go, by punishing incorrect go
responses more harshly than incorrect no-go responses; correct responses were not punished.
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generating the expected response biases in each A-V condition.
Analyses of HR scores, FAR scores and response bias were re-
stricted to difficult trials due to ceiling performance on the easy
trials (90% accuracy, Figure S1 in the online supplemental
materials).
Response bias was measured by calculating c, derived from
signal detection theory (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) for each A-V
experimental condition (Equation 2):
c   0.5zHR  zFAR, (2)
where z represents the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian
distribution, HR is the hit rate (correct go responses divided by
the total number of go trials) and FAR is the false alarm rate
(incorrect no-go divided by the total number of no-go trials). A
negative value of c indicates a greater tendency toward go
responses while positive values indicate a bias toward no-go
responses.
The “log-linear” approach (Hautus, 1995) was used to deal
with cases of 1 or 0 HRs/FARs for the response bias calculation.
This involves adding 0.5 to the number of hits and the number
of false alarms and 1 to the total number of go and no-go trials. HR,
FAR and response bias were analyzed using repeated-measures
ANOVAs with threat (threat, safe), action bias (go, no-go), and
valence (reward, punishment) as within-subject factors.
Results
Anxiety Manipulation Check
While performing the SART, participants rated themselves sig-
nificantly more anxious (M  5.38, SEM  0.31; t(61)  12.82,
p  .001, dz  1.64, 95% confidence interval (CI) for the mean
difference [3.06, 4.19]), stressed (M  5.13, SEM  0.31; t(61) 
10.61, p  .001, dz  1.36, 95% CI for the mean difference [2.50,
3.66]), and afraid (M  4.54, SEM  0.32; t(61)  11.21, p 
.001, dz  1.44, 95% CI for the mean difference [2.63, 3.77])
during threat relative to safe blocks (safe ratings of anxiety: M 
1.75, SEM 0.16, stress: M 2.05, SEM 0.20, fear: M 1.34,
SEM 0.11). Similarly, while performing the reinforced go/no-go
task, participants rated themselves significantly more anxious
(M  5.06, SEM  0.32; t(61)  8.64, p  .001, dz  1.10, 95%
CI for the mean difference [2.37, 3.80]), stressed (M  4.97,
SEM  0.34; t(61)  8.94, p  .001, dz  1.14, 95% CI for the
mean difference [2.24, 3.53]), and afraid (M  4.47, SEM  0.32;
t(61)  10.17, p  .001, dz  1.29, 95% CI for the mean
difference [2.53, 3.76]) during threat relative to safe blocks (safe
ratings of anxiety: M  1.98, SEM  0.21, stress: M  2.08,
SEM  0.22, fear: M  1.32, SEM  0.15).
SART
Threat increases no-go accuracy. As expected, participants
performed more accurately on no-go trials under threat relative
to safe conditions, t(1,60)  3.57, p  .001, dz  0.46, 95% CI
for the mean difference [2.84, 10.11] (Figure 3a), replic-
ating previous findings (Aylward & Robinson, 2017; Grillon
et al., 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, et al., 2013; Torrisi et al.,
2016).
Threat slows responses on correct go trials. Participants
were significantly slower to respond correctly on go trials under
threat relative to safe, t(60)  2.41, p  .019, dz  0.31, 95% CI
for the mean difference [0.75, 8.03] (Figure 3b).
Reinforced Go/No-Go Task
Threat Increases punishment-induced inhibition when ac-
tion is biased toward go. There were significant main effects of
action bias, F(1, 61)  47.77, p  .001, p2 0.439, and valence,
F(1, 61) 5.00, p .029, p2 0.076, and a significant action bias
by valence interaction, F(1, 61)  8.38, p  .005, p2 0.121, on
normalized RTs for correct go trials. Pairwise comparisons indi-
cated that participants were significantly slower in the GA condi-
tion (Z scores: M  1.06, SEM  0.04; Pavlovian and instru-
mental in conflict) compared with the GW condition (M  1.12,
SEM  0.04; Pavlovian and instrumental aligned), F(1, 61) 
14.19, p  .001, p2  0.189, 95% CI for the mean difference
[0.03, 0.09]. However, there was no significant difference between
the NGW and NGA conditions, F(1, 61)  0.055, p  .82, p2 
0.001, 95% CI for the mean difference [0.04, 0.03]. This inter-
action thus replicates the predicted pattern of Pavlovian and in-
strumental conflict in the go conditions (e.g., Guitart-Masip et al.,
2014).
Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant three-
way interaction between threat, action bias and valence, F(1, 61)
4.83, p  .032, p2  0.073. This interaction was driven by a
significant action bias by valence interaction under threat, F(1,
61)  10.39, p  .002, p2  0.146, but not under safe, F(1, 61) 
1.06, p  .309, p2 0.017. Under threat, participants were
significantly slower to make a correct response to avoid punish-
ment (GA) than to obtain reward (GW; i.e., when the action was
biased toward go), F(1, 61) 13.32, p .001, p2 0.179, but not
when actions were biased toward no-go (no difference between
NGW and NGA), F(1, 61)  1.11, p  .30, p2 0.018. Impor-
tantly, participants were significantly slower under threat than safe
for the GA condition, F(1, 61)  4.39, p  .04, dz  0.27, 95%
CI for the mean difference [0.002, 0.093] (Figure 4), but there was
no significant difference between threat and safe for the other three
conditions (GW, NGW, NGA all p .05; Figure 4). Indeed, Bayes
factor analysis showed that the null model was substantially better
than the threat model for GW (BF10  0.15), NGW (BF10  0.29)
and NGA (BF10  0.16). Post hoc paired t tests revealed no
significant differences between GA under threat with NGA under
threat or safe (all ts  2, all ps  0.2).
In summary, ToS only enhanced inhibition of actions (driven by
Pavlovian aversive processing) in the face of potential punishment
when the Pavlovian and instrumental systems were in conflict. In
other words, acute anxiety promoted increased reliance on Pav-
lovian biases in aversive but not appetitive conflict contexts.
Go/no-go bias check.
Response bias. The effectiveness of the reward and punish-
ment reinforcements were assessed with response bias, c, with
negative values indicating a greater propensity toward go re-
sponses and positive values toward no-go responses. There was
only a significant main effect of action bias, F(1, 61) 41.43, p
.001, p2 0.404, 95% CI for the mean difference [0.24, 0.46].
Participants were thus biased toward go responses in the go con-
ditions (M  0.25, SEM  0.05) and toward no-go in the no-go
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conditions (M  0.10, SEM  0.05). This indicates that the task
payoff schedule for each condition (bias actions toward go vs.
no-go by rewarding/punishing actions differentially) worked as
intended. All other main effects and interactions were nonsignifi-
cant (all Fs  3, all ps  0.1), suggesting that threat does not
specifically affect sensitivity to punished or rewarded outcomes.
Indeed, according to Bayes factor analysis, all models that in-
cluded threat as a factor were at least 17 times worse than the
action bias model, providing strong evidence against an effect of
threat.
Hits and false alarms. Consistent with the pattern of response
bias, there was a main effect of action bias, F(1, 61)  41.93, p 
.001, p2  0.407, 95% CI for the mean difference [0.10, 0.19], on
HR. As expected, participants made more hits in go (M 71.33%,
SEM  1.76%) relative to no-go (M  57.12%, SEM  1.97%)
conditions. No other main effect or interaction was significant (all
Fs  3, all ps  0.1). All models that included threat as a factor
were at least 36 times worse than the action bias model, providing
very strong evidence against an effect of threat. There was also a
significant main effect of action bias on FAR, F(1, 61)  26.67,
p .001, p2 0.304, 95% CI for the mean difference [0.07, 0.15].
Participants thus committed more commission errors on no-go
trials when the action was biased toward go (M 46.73%, SEM
1.95%) than when the payoff schedule biased participants’ actions
toward no-go (M  35.84%, SEM  2.00%), replicating the
results of Crockett et al. (2009). This effect was also not modulated
by threat, nor was any other main effect or interaction significant
(all Fs  3, all ps  0.1). Similarly, Bayes factor analysis showed
that all models that included threat as a factor were at least 21
times worse than the action bias model, providing strong evidence
against an effect of threat.
Discussion
In this study we replicate prior work demonstrating increased
response inhibition under ToS, while at the same time extending
these findings to encompass inhibition in aversive and appetitive
contexts. We argue that threat-potentiated inhibition is selective
for go responses associated with potentially negative outcomes.
This is consistent with the proposition that adaptive anxiety po-
tentiates harm–avoidant behavior (Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013)
and, importantly, could plausibly be driven by an aversive Pav-
lovian bias overriding instrumental behavioral control. In other
words, these findings support the novel proposition that one cog-
nitive consequence of anxiety is an increased reliance on aversive,
but not appetitive, Pavlovian control over behavior.
Our results suggest that ToS is involved in facilitating the
coupling between response inhibition and punishment predictions
in motivational behavior. This is evidenced by slowed responses
specifically when go actions were required to avoid punishments
Figure 3. Violin and overlaid box and error bar plots of the sustained attention to response task data. (a)
Accuracy on the no-go trials across threat and safe conditions. Threat significantly increased accuracy compared
with safe blocks (p  .001). (b) Reaction times on go trials across threat and safe conditions. Threat
significantly slowed responses (p  .019). Black dots represent the mean and associated error bars represent
standard error of the mean for within-subjects variance.
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during threat. Overall performance in the GA condition was
slowed relative to the condition when Pavlovian and instrumental
behaviors cooperate (i.e., GW). This indicates that the task worked
as intended (at least when actions were biased toward go), as
performance was altered when Pavlovian and instrumental con-
trollers favored opposite behaviors (Crockett, Clark, Apergis-
Schoute, Morein-Zamir, & Robbins, 2012; Crockett et al., 2009;
Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). Critically,
however, under ToS, this slowing was exacerbated, inducing
greater inhibitory responses. We argue that this slowing indicates
that ToS promotes greater reliance on Pavlovian inhibitory biases
during potentially punishing events, effectively abolishing the
influence of instrumental control during a threatening context.
Importantly, threat did not modulate performance during any of the
appetitive conditions, which suggests that anxiety might only
promote Pavlovian biases in the face of potential punishments.
This task also enables the separation of response inhibition and
valence-specific behavioral responses. Previous research has con-
sistently found that ToS impacts response inhibition (Aylward &
Robinson, 2017; Grillon et al., 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, et al.,
2013; Torrisi et al., 2016) as well as in aversive processes (Grillon
& Charney, 2011; Robinson, Charney, Overstreet, Vytal, & Gril-
lon, 2012; Robinson, Letkiewicz, Overstreet, Ernst, & Grillon,
2011). However, the commission error rates and the response bias
measure indicate that neither response inhibition nor punishment
signaling were modulated by threat independently in this task. As
such, these data further suggest that anxiety in motivational be-
havior is particularly important for a unitary aversive-linked inhi-
bition process. Thus, in addition to the accumulating evidence of
anxiety-potentiated “neutral” response inhibition (Aylward &
Robinson, 2017; Grillon et al., 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, et al.,
2013; Torrisi et al., 2016), we show that anxiety specifically
promotes response inhibition in a situation where the prepotent
response is inhibition (i.e., when the context is specifically aver-
sive). This suggests that ToS, by virtue of being a global aversive
context, may promote a “generic” bias toward inhibition on the
SART and other tasks because inhibition is the prepotent response
to aversive contexts (Aylward & Robinson, 2017; de Berker et al.,
2016; Grillon et al., 2016; Robinson, Krimsky, et al., 2013; Torrisi
et al., 2016).
This hypothesis is consistent with theories of how adaptive
anxiety impacts cognition (Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013). Specif-
ically, when something is potentially harmful, anxiety promotes
behavior that will avoid interaction with it, at the potential detri-
ment to goal-directed behavior. Instrumental behavior is particu-
larly disrupted when anxiety promotes behavior that is task-
incongruent (Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013), as is the case in the go
to avoid losing condition. Indeed, in the GA condition, ToS leads
to a maladaptive strategy that could potentially lead to more harm
in this specific context, where avoidance is promoted yet the
optimal strategy should be invigoration. This coupling of actions
(go to avoid punishment) is actually rare in nature (at least to distal
threats; McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008) which
means that relying on Pavlovian biases likely remains adaptive on
average. Nevertheless, these findings provide a possible mecha-
nism by which maladaptive behavior may arise in anxiety disor-
ders, where this “hard-wired” Pavlovian response can overrule
more immediate “correct” behaviors. Critically, in pathological
anxiety, this Pavlovian override may occur even in the absence of
experimentally induced threat (Mkrtchian et al., 2017; Robinson et
al., 2014).
Figure 4. Violin plots with overlaid box and error bar plots showing normalized RTs (standardized against the
practice baseline) for correct go trials in each action–valence condition under threat and safe conditions. Less
negative values indicate slower responses. Threat significantly slowed responses during go to avoid punishment
compared with safe blocks (p  .04). This indicates that threat selectively potentiates inhibition of actions in
the face of punishment when the Pavlovian and instrumental systems are in conflict, by increasing reliance on
aversive Pavlovian biases. Black dots depict the mean and associated error bars represent standard error of the
mean for the within-subjects variance.
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One of the advantages of the current task is that it allows the
quantification of Pavlovian-instrumental interactions with re-
sponse latencies. RTs may be more sensitive to modulation than
choice responses as choice provides binomial outcomes while RTs
provide continuous outcomes, allowing for greater variability. This
may be particularly important when investigating healthy partici-
pants. It may be the case that the mechanisms of anxiety are similar
in healthy and patient populations but that the effects are exacer-
bated in anxiety disorders, resulting in maladaptive behaviors in
the latter but not the former population (Robinson, Vytal, et al.,
2013). Interestingly, we have shown that patients with mood and
anxiety disorders but not healthy participants, exhibit an increased
reliance on avoidance Pavlovian biases under threat in a concep-
tually similar task that measures choice outcomes (Mkrtchian et
al., 2017). It might therefore be the case that the effect of ToS on
Pavlovian-instrumental interactions is subtle and only emerges
with RTs in healthy participants. Indeed, this is in line with current
theoretical approaches to psychiatry that view mood disorders on
a continuous rather than on a dichotomous scale (Cuthbert & Insel,
2013; Robinson et al., 2014). Effects may be subtle, and may not
affect performance (i.e., winning or losing points) in healthy
participants but could disrupt performance in patients. This may
also explain why our choice measures (response bias, HR, and
FAR) are not modulated by threat. Indeed, the original study using
this task only found an effect of tryptophan depletion on the RTs
on this task and not on the choice measures (Crockett et al., 2009).
To clarify this however, future studies should aim to investigate
performance on the present reinforced go/no-go task under ToS
with patient populations as well.
Prior neuroimaging work show that ToS enhances punishment
but not reward prediction error signals in the striatum during the
processing of aversive Pavlovian cues-outcome associations (Rob-
inson, Overstreet, et al., 2013). Importantly, ToS only modulates
activity in the ventral and not dorsal striatum. The ventral striatum,
it has been argued, underlies Pavlovian signals, while the dorsal is
associated with instrumental processes (Corbit, Muir, & Balleine,
2001). Furthermore, threat-potentiated inhibition on the SART is
also associated with increased activity in the striatum (Torrisi et
al., 2016). As such, ToS might specifically affect aversive Pav-
lovian but not instrumental striatal circuitry. Future work should
therefore explore if striatal-driven aversive Pavlovian biases may
override instrumental-driven neural circuitry under ToS.
As a potential caveat, it should be noted that it is possible that
ToS influences motivational behavior by impairing instrumental
control rather than by promoting aversive Pavlovian control. How-
ever, we believe that this is unlikely for a number of reasons. First,
the present results are consistent with the previously discussed
studies indicating that anxiety affects Pavlovian mechanisms (Du-
its et al., 2015; Lissek et al., 2005; Robinson, Overstreet, et al.,
2013). Strikingly, a recent study demonstrated that avoidance
behavior in mood and anxiety disorders is driven by aversive
Pavlovian biases as tested in a similar Pavlovian-instrumental task
(Mkrtchian et al., 2017). Second, in contrast to instrumental be-
haviors, aversive Pavlovian biases are evolutionary adaptive and
rapid mechanisms evolved to avoid potential harm and increase
survival (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). They may therefore have a
particularly important role in adaptive anxiety, which itself is
likely an evolutionary adaptive mechanism. Thus from an evolu-
tionary standpoint, it would make sense for anxiety, a state that
accompanies potentially threatening situations, to potentiate a
mechanism programmed to avoid harm, as opposed to disengaging
the instrumental system. If anxiety instead impaired the instrumen-
tal system, it would likely lead to increased exposure of harmful
situations because, as highlighted above, the instrumental and
Pavlovian systems are generally aligned to facilitate optimal be-
haviors in nature (Rangel et al., 2008). Based on these findings, we
propose that the most plausible explanation for our results is that
anxiety influences motivational behavior via modulation of aver-
sive Pavlovian processes. However, we acknowledge that these
results do not provide definitive evidence that the increased inhi-
bition under threat is driven by aversive Pavlovian biases. In light
of this, interpretations are tentative and future studies are war-
ranted to confirm the present results.
As a further caveat, it should be noted that the no-go conditions
were not significantly different from each other. We might expect
performance to be significantly slower in the NGA condition
compared with the NGW condition as the Pavlovian and instru-
mental controllers both promote inhibitory responses (slowing of
responses) in the NGA condition while they compete in the NGW
condition. However, the response bias, HR, and FAR scores all
indicate that the reinforcement schedules were in fact successful in
generating an action bias. This lack of difference might be attrib-
uted to RTs in the no-go conditions being at floor levels. Indeed,
there was no significant difference between the GA condition
under threat compared with the NGA condition under safe and
threat. This is perhaps surprising as we would expect the NGA
condition to produce the slowest responses as both Pavlovian and
instrumental responses promote inhibition (while the slowing of
responses in the GA condition under threat is only driven by the
Pavlovian no-go bias). It thus seems that the slowest participants
can perform on this task is capped at the level of the GA condition
under threat. It is therefore not entirely clear whether the effect of
ToS on Pavlovian-instrumental interactions is driven simply by an
aversive Pavlovian bias, or if it is specific to when Pavlovian bias
conflicts with instrumental processes in an aversive context. An-
other possibility might be that the conflict between Pavlovian and
instrumental controllers in the NGW condition promote cautious-
ness and slowing, rendering it similarly slow as the NGA condi-
tion. A final possibility is that this specific task is simply insen-
sitive to appetitive Pavlovian-instrumental conflict. However, we
believe that if ToS affected appetitive conflict as well, it would still
have been revealed by the present task. Specifically, if ToS in-
duced a general slowing of responses, regardless of an appetitive
or aversive context, we would also expect to see slowing of
responses under threat in the GW condition. This is not supported
by the data. If, on the other hand, ToS induced a greater reliance
on Pavlovian appetitive biases or impaired instrumental control in
the appetitive condition, we would expect faster responses under
threat in the NGW condition. Faster response times would be
possible, as evidenced by faster response times on other condi-
tions. However, this effect of threat was not observed. Moreover,
the present results are in line with previous studies demonstrating
that ToS only affects aversive but not appetitive conditions (for a
review see Robinson, Vytal, et al., 2013). In summary, our view is
that the most parsimonious explanation for the results that were
observed is that threat impacts aversive Pavlovian responding.
However, future studies might plausibly explore the impact of
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stimulus presentation duration on RTs to attempt to tease these
effects apart.
Finally, it should be noted that our main analysis slightly devi-
ated from the original study (Crockett et al., 2009) such that the
first practice block was chosen as the response latency baseline as
opposed to the first neutral block. Prior to analysis, we reasoned
that this would be the most appropriate measure of baseline RTs in
our study. Another possible baseline could have been the first
neutral block during the safe condition, in accordance with Crock-
ett et al. (2009). However, due to the counterbalanced threat
manipulation in our study, only half of the participants experienced
the first neutral block under the safe condition. Power to detect an
effect would therefore be reduced to 50% with this baseline, and
perhaps more importantly, the threat manipulation would no longer
be counterbalanced, rendering it an inappropriate baseline choice.
Future studies should include a neutral block before the threat
manipulation to assess baseline RTs, so as to replicate the analyses
of Crockett et al. (2009) precisely.
In conclusion, this is the first study to suggest that ToS selec-
tively promotes punishment-induced inhibition in motivational
behavior. Importantly, the present study provides a potential mech-
anistic understanding of this: Adaptive anxiety promotes avoidant
behavior in potentially harmful situations by increasing reliance on
aversive Pavlovian processes.
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